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criminology alongside the many other genres that deal with crime and pun-
ishment-but they must understand them and recognize how they reorganize
his or her field of study. Jones offers no such understanding. He writes as if
all that happened in the late nineteenth century was a change of names
(" 'criminology' ... was used first in 1879 ... penology having been the widely
used term before then" (l5]). This rather ahistorical "What's in a name?"
approach fails to capture the very different premises, questions, and ambitions
that distinguished the criminology of Lombroso from the criminal jurisprud-
ence of Beccaria, let alone the difference that demarcates the other genres of
crime writing.
This baleful lack of theoretical understanding that undermines Jones's his-
tory is most fully revealed when, in the final chapter, he offers his own version
of criminological theorizing. This, "the author's own existential viewpoint,"
is an embarrassing and unrestrained disquisition that suggests that criminality
be understood in terms of "the will to power." In its generalizations about
"the criminal" ("the criminal is the exploiter! He is the capitalist par excel-
lence" [218]), and its pseudo-Nietzschean psychology ("We are all criminals!"),
the final sections of the book show that, for the author at least, little of value
is to be learned from this version of criminology's past.
David Garland
Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale 1927-1960. Chapel Hill: Uni-
versity of North Carolina Press, 1986. Pp. xii, 314. $35.00 (ISBN: 0-
8078-1677-9).
Laura Kalman's monograph, originally a dissertation, is nevertheless a fresh
and rather engaging study of a finished chapter in intellectual history-the
legal realist movement. It flourished in the 1930s, revived in another form
after World War II, and then faded away around 1960, when Kalman ends
her work. By that time, legal realism had left an indistinct legacy that was
widely shared. It was always a rather shapeless growth, even in its prime.
Kalman proposes to give the movement some coherence by concentrating
on its manifestations at the Yale Law School. Yet, after an introductory chapter
in which she locates realism in the broader setting of functionalism as a way
of doing history and other social sciences, the second chapter is about Harvard
Law School; much of the third chapter is about curricular changes at Columbia
and Yale. Late in the day, Yale occupies all of the fourth and fifth chapters;
but the sixth and last again turns to HarVard.
This is not as zigzagging a course as I have made it appear. One can ill
afford to write about a churning force in legal thought and legal education
without ascertaining the role of Harvard. That Harvard early on "rejected"
realism establishes a baseline for what anyone else did. That Harvard by 1960
had made peace with realism marks another boundary. As for Columbia, it
is inescapable that realism started there or, if one insists on pushing its origins
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back to Holmes, that it first became a recognizable influence in legal education
and scholarship at Columbia in the 1920s, where halfa dozen faculty members,
led by Karl Lewellyn and Herman Oliphant, attempted to reorder the cur-
riculum along "functional" lines, meaning chiefly that the content of courses
was to be repackaged in order to reflect the commercial and human interests
at stake, and that social science materials would be included to illuminate
those interests. But, although the reformers initially enjoyed support from
President Nicholas Murray Butler (this is surprising in retrospect, because
Butler is now remembered as an establishment stalwart), his appointment of
a middle-of-the-road dean resulted in five resignations (Lewellyn loyally stayed
on). So, Kalman writes, "after 1928 the headquarters of legal realism shifted
from Columbia to Yale" (75).
If the packet of mixed seeds that made up the realist movement was to
bloom anywhere, Yale was the place, and 1928 the time. Dean Thomas Swan,
recruited and then reinforced by the powerful contracts scholar Arthur Corbin,
had brought the school out of provincial obscurity by making strong faculty
appointments. When Swan went on the Second Circuit bench in 1927, Robert
Hutchins, for whom the word dynamic would have had to be invented (he
was only twenty-seven), took the reins, scooped up two of the Columbia
defectors (Underhill Moore and William Douglas), and set the school definitely
on a realist course before he left in 1929 for the presidency of Chicago.
Kalman's account of realism at Yale combines with her main theme a
detailed account of almost everything else of interest that happened at Yale,
first in the 1930s when Charles E. Clark followed Hutchins as dean, and then
in the postwar period 1946-1960. Indeed, her recounting of the school's for-
tunes is the best local history we have of a critical quarter-century (the World
War II years, with faculty and students mostly gone, are a blank). One may
properly ask, what does most of Kalman's chronicle have to do with legal
realism? She tells us that "institutional factors" explain the failure of realist
strains to dominate the 1930s. When realism had a renaissance after the war,
but then appeared to lose steam during the 1950s, that too occurred partly
because ofexternal pressures, partly because certain elements ofthe movement
came to be taken for granted, at Yale and even at Harvard, always the Mother
Church, much as Yale people hated to admit it.
If one accepts the relevance of exogenous and even fortuitous forces, one
does not mind at all reading juicy accounts of such 1930s issues as Dean
Clark's poor rapport with Yale's President James Rowland Angell, in contrast
to Hutchins's intimacy; Clark's related lack of success in getting adequate
financial support from the university; the fading away of empirical research
activities (except for Underhill Moore's tireless parking and bank collection
studies); the seduction of key faculty members by the New Deal; the persistent
Harvard-phobia of Clark and others, which affected the culminating event of
the decade, the struggle over the deanship when Dean Clark in his turn went
to the Second Circuit. Ai least two-thirds of the professors supported their
Harvard-trained colleague Harry Shulman. The oposition was intransigent.
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Influenced also by anti-Semitic elements, the choice finally fell to an amiable
conservative, A. G. Gulliver. Thus ended the decade.
After the war, a committed realist, Wesley Sturges, became dean. He was
almost immediately hampered by cool relations with Presidents Seymour and
Griswold; by charges from alumni quarters that the curriculum was loaded
with far-out seminars (in which very few students actually enrolled); by con-
servative trustees (led by Robert A. Taft) hostile to the appointment of ultra-
liberals (Thomas Emerson, Fowler Harper) and a suspect social scientist,
Harold Lasswell; by brushes with cold-war crusaders.
Intellectually, this era was enlivened by what Kalman aptly dubs "The
Realists vs. The Realists" (164). In one corner, Judge Jerome Frank, author
of the 1931 bombshell, Law and the Modern Mind, by now living in New
Haven, teaching a course called "Fact Finding," and preaching heavy clinical
training. In the other, Lasswell and Myres McDougal, tirelessly proclaiming
"policy science" as the mission of legal education. Though both positions
were influential, neither prevailed. And the inhibiting influences this time were
. not so extraneous to the intellectual currents as they were in the 1930s.
One more wrenching episode occurred, reported fully and scrupulously by
Kalman. Harry Shulman, having at last become dean in 1954, joined with
President Griswold in withholding promotion from Professor Vern Country-
man on grounds that must have confused Countryman's liberal politics with
the quality of his scholarship (Countryman went on to distinguished service
at Harvard). Shulman soon died of cancer; poignantly, he was dean less than
a year. Faculty morale, this reviewer can testify, was at its nadir. But then
Eugene Rostow, sunny, confident, expansive, became dean. He spectacularly
replenished and enlarged the faculty, and he presided over curricular regroup-
ings that came as close as one could wish to a "functional" organization. It
is said to be trite to declare that "we are all realists" (229). But we all were-
for a time.
What did it mean, to be a realist? Did it require anything more than a
mistrust of conceptual thinking, a skepticism about orthodox descriptions of
the judicial, legislative, and administrative processes, and a willingness to
experiment with teaching methods that went beyond the austere Langdellian
casebook? Adherence to these three attitudes, I think, qualified one at least
to pose as a legal realist, junior grade.
Kalman's catalog in her opening chapter of the attributes of realism is an
eclectic one. She is right; it was an eclectic movement. Her modest mission,
ably carried out, was to flesh out the catalog by a critical examination of the
Yale experience. .
A briefepilogue ventures generalizations. She concludes that, "Intellectually,
realism had not proved significant; pedagogically, it had not fulfilled its prom-
ise" (230). Saved for the very last word is a sudden (self-revealing?) spear
thrust: "realism's most important message [was] a message so arresting that
even the realists never dared face it-that all law is politics." (231).
Ralph S. Brown
